Jason Aldean’s Violent Hatred on Full Display in New Song

I want to take a short break from the Saving the Court project to share a few thoughts about country music star Jason Aldean and his controversial song, “Try That in a Small Town.” But first, let me tell you about Henry Choate.

In 1927, Henry Choate was 18-years-old. He was a black man living in Tennessee and working on a road construction crew. That November, Henry visited his grandfather for Armistice Day. Henry’s grandfather, who was 85-years old and a former slave, lived near Columbia, Tennessee, about an hour south of Nashville.

While Henry was at his grandfather’s home, a young white woman in Columbia claimed she had been attacked by a black man. The local sheriff undertook a manhunt and arrested Henry, throwing him in jail. While there, a gang of approximately 250 vigilantes broke into the jail and kidnapped Henry. They beat him with a hammer, tied his body to the back of a pickup truck and dragged him through the streets of Columbia, and then lynched him from the second floor of the Maury County Courthouse. Accounts later revealed that the sheriff had likely arrested an innocent man. No one was ever arrested for Henry Choate’s murder.

What does this have to do with Jason Aldean? Let me tell you.

If you’re not familiar with Aldean’s song, “Try that in a Small Town,” then you may not know that in the song, Aldean threatens to shoot anyone who tries to take his guns, conflates legal protests with property damage and looting, compares burning the American flag to carjacking and spitting in the face of a cop, and threatens that if you do any of the things he sings about in his song, you won’t get very far before some “good ol’ boys, raised up right,” will track you down.

The song is disturbing. This trope that someone is going to try to take away our guns is tired and overused. For more than a century, reactionary extremists have predicted that the government is coming after their guns. Of course, it’s never actually happened. In fact, we have more access to more kinds of guns today than we ever have. But that doesn’t stop Aldean from threatening violence.

The song is also disturbing because Aldean doesn’t seem to understand (or doesn’t care) that protesting and burning the flag are both Constitutionally protected acts. He lumps those actions in with carjacking, robbing a liquor store, and spitting in a cop’s face, and threatens anyone that does any of these things. Aldean has not been shy about his political beliefs. He’s a proud conservative (some would say “extreme right-winger”) who has wrapped himself in the flag and proclaimed his love for the Constitution. It would seem that his love doesn’t extend to the entire Constitution, just certain cherry-picked parts.

Perhaps most disturbing is that Aldean decided it was a good idea to film the video for his controversial song in front of the Maury County Courthouse; the same courthouse where Henry Choate was lynched. Is that just a coincidence? I don’t think so. I think it was a warning to anyone so bold as to step outside the lines that Aldean and his ilk have drawn, and a reminder of what happens to anyone who forgets their place.

Aldean’s song hits a definite sour note, attempting to point out the nobility of small towns, but instead painting them as intolerant and violent. Of course, Aldean actually doesn’t know about small towns. He’s never lived in one. So, maybe we shouldn’t be surprised that he gets it all so wrong.

Rock & Roll Hall of Famer Sheryl Crow also thinks Aldean got it wrong. On her Twitter feed, Crow took Aldean to task, saying “I’m from a small town. Even people in small towns are sick of violence. There’s nothing small-town or American about promoting violence. You should know that better than anyone having survived a mass shooting. This is not American or small town-like. It’s just lame.”

That’s right. Aldean was on stage for a concert in Las Vegas when a lone gunman shot into his audience with a high-powered rifle, killing 60 people and wounding more than 400. It’s nice to see that the experience didn’t sour Aldean on guns and deadly violence.

Aldean has a history of making ugly, controversial statements about vaccines and transgender youth, so it’s not surprising to hear him make the threats contained in “Try That in a Small Town.” Even so, we can’t become numb to such hate or allow it to be normalized. It’s wrong and it shouldn’t be allowed to exist without some pushback. That’s why I was happy to see that Country Music Television (CMT) has decided not to play Aldean’s hateful video. I’d like to think that country radio stations will follow suit, but I doubt it. Unfortunately, there are too many people who listen to those stations and feel exactly the way Aldean feels. And maybe that’s the most disturbing thing of all.

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Saving the Court: Expanding the Number of Justices (Part 5)

This is part 5 of the Saving the Court series. I would encourage you to read previous posts, including

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History of the Size of the Supreme Court

The size of the Supreme Court has changed several times throughout our country’s history. The Judiciary Act of 1798 set the number of Justices at six. The Judiciary Act of 1801 reduced the number of Justices to five. One year later, the Judiciary Act of 1802 returned the Court to six Justices. In 1807, with the addition of a seventh circuit court, the size of the Court was increased to seven. Two additional circuits were added in 1837, and the Supreme Court also grew by two Justices, setting the total number at nine.

The Civil War prompted further change to the Court. In 1862 and 1863, a tenth circuit was added, and with it, the Supreme Court grew to ten Justices. In 1866, at the conclusion of the Civil War, Congress reduced the number of Justices from ten down to seven. Just three years later, in 1869, the number of Justices on the Supreme Court was once again increased to nine, where it has remained ever since.

However, that does not mean that efforts have not been made to change the size of the Court since that time. Theodore Roosevelt led an effort in 1912 to increase the number of Justices on the Court. In 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed a far-reaching plan to significantly increase the size of the Court to as many as fifteen Justices. Although these and other efforts failed, the size of the Court seems to be always up for debate. Without fail, whether successful or not, calls to change the size of the Court are made for political reasons. Even in cases where the change in size is warranted, one party or the other benefits politically from the change.

Current Proposal to Add Seats to the Supreme Court

The current call to increase the size of the Court is no different. Democrats have suffered from Republicans’ ability to place friendly Justices on the Court. Increasing the size of the Court is a way for Democrats to fight back and restore the Court to a sort of equilibrium. Of course, the equilibrium Democrats propose favors them politically.

It is wrong to say that the Court is intended to be non-political, so reform efforts must also be non-political. There are two problems with this way of thinking. First, it is impossible to separate the good-government motivations for reform from the partisan. Second, Congress has the Constitutional power to shape the Supreme Court as it sees fit. Congress, by its very nature, is a highly partisan institution, and everything it does is in the very least tinged with partisanship. It is unrealistic to expect it to do otherwise.

There is nothing inherently wrong with partisan efforts to reform the Supreme Court. They have happened throughout history. The important thing is to recognize and acknowledge the political motivations behind any reform proposal.

The current proposal being floated by Democrats is to increase the Court to thirteen members. By adding four new members to the Supreme Court, Democrats hope to have a slight 7-6 majority.

Obviously, Republicans are opposed to this plan. They refer to it as “Court packing” and believe that it is being done for partisan reasons. Democrats, on the other hand, refer to their plan as “unpacking the court,” referring to what they feel were Republican norm-breaking moves to block Merrick Garland from the Court, and rush Amy Coney Barrett onto the Court.

However, Democrats do not view proposals to expand the Court as purely political. They feel the norm-violating actions that led to the current makeup of the Court, as well as the misalignment of the current Court with prevailing views and values of the American public is a threat to the health of our democracy. They view the unbalanced Court as threatening Court precedence in areas such as reproductive rights, racial justice, worker’s rights, voting rights, and other hard-fought rights gained over many years of struggle. Expanding the size of the Court, they feel, is a constitutional and immediately achievable way to address that threat, as well as restore legitimacy to the Court.

Expanding the size of the Court is also a way to incorporate more diverse Justices with professional perspectives not currently represented on the Court. According to Alicia Bannon, Director of the Judiciary Program at The Brennan Center for Justice, “That diversity could come from the inclusion of Justices with experience in different sectors of the legal community or even the public sphere more generally. It also might include individuals of diverse religious, socioeconomic, racial, geographical, or other demographic backgrounds. Expanded diversity could enrich the Court’s decision-making, and a Court that was drawn from a broader cross-section of society would be well received by the public.”

Proponents claim there is also a practical advantage to expanding the Court. For instance, a larger Court may be able to hear more cases and spend more time on emergency orders, what has come to be known as the “shadow docket.” Today’s Supreme Court decides about half as many cases in a year as it did during the 1980s, when the Court routinely decided 150 to 160 cases each year. By comparison, the Court only decides 70 to 80 cases a year now. During the 2023 term, that number was down to just 58.

As might be guessed, opponents to the idea of increasing the size of the Supreme Court have largely the opposite view of proponents. They do not view the philosophical direction of the current Court as a threat to the health of our democracy. In fact, just the opposite. They view the retrenchment taking place recently in the Court as necessary for our continuing democracy.

They also view expansion as a threat to the independence of the Court. They warn that the Court’s check on the other branches of government could be undermined by a Congress that can change the size of the Court any time it issues a decision the majority in Congress disagrees with. They claim that “court packing” tends to undermine the Justices’ willingness to maintain their independence from the very body they are supposed to act as a check toward. Of course, Congress’s ability to change the size of the court at their discretion is one way that Congress can act as a check on the judiciary.

Opponents to expanding the Court also point to the traditionally strong and bipartisan norm of treating Court expansion as something that just is not done. Both Democrats and Republicans historically have celebrated Congress’s refusal to pass FDR’s Court packing proposal. Members of both parties have a longstanding distaste for changing the size of the Court to suit political preferences.

Opponents also point to leaders in other countries that used court expansion as a means of transferring power to the Executive. In particular, they point to Carlos Menm in Argentina, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey as leaders who added friendly justices to their countries’ supreme courts as a way of consolidating power for themselves. By contrast, these opponents to Court expansion point to strong democracies around the world that have retained a firm commitment to judicial independence and have avoided making changes to the size of their highest courts.           

Rather than maintaining and strengthening the Court’s legitimacy, opponents of Court expansion argue that increasing the size of the Court will destroy the Court’s legitimacy. They argue that decisions made by a Court that was expanded for nakedly partisan reasons would not enjoy the type of public support the Court’s decisions have received in the past. In addition, they say that Court packing now led by a Democratic majority in Congress would likely be met with continuous cycles of expansion-reduction as Republicans take over the majority. Supreme Court reform, particularly the size of the Court, would be on the agenda of every incoming Congress. The prospects of an ever-changing Supreme Court, they warn, does not bode well for the Court, the country, or our democracy.

Discussion: On the surface, I am a fan of Court expansion. I agree with those that argue that Republicans violated norms and perverted the system to “steal” two seats from Democrats. This violation of norms cannot go unanswered. The Supreme Court, as it now stands, is unbalanced and philosophically out-of-step with the views and values of the American public. This lack of balance and philosophical mismatch—not Court expansion—has led to the current legitimacy crisis faced by the Court.

In particular, I am sympathetic to expanding the size of the Court for historical reasons. For a good part of our nation’s history, the size of the Court was linked to the number of circuit courts. We currently have thirteen circuit courts, and I think there is historical justification based on this fact to increase the number of Justices on the Supreme Court.

There are two ways to look at the idea of expanding the Court. If you are convinced, as many Court observers are, that the current court has an extremist agenda they are carrying out and that that agenda is intended to roll back rights formerly enjoyed by Americans, then expanding the court in an effort to stop this effort is a reasonable way to reform the Court.

Many, particularly on the left (but not exclusively) have opined that the Court, particularly during the 2022 and 2023 sessions, is acting as an activist political body rather than as a deliberative judiciary, and allowing it to continue in this way threatens our democracy. University of Texas Law Professor Steve Vladek commented that the current Court is acting more like a mini, unelected legislature, creating law from the bench rather than interpreting laws passed by Congress or regulations implemented by government agencies.

From this view, Court expansion makes sense as a way to reign in the excess of the Supreme Court and to return the Court to a judicial body, rather than a super-legislature. Expanding the Court can also serve to bring the viewpoints expressed by the Court more in line with the thoughts of the American people.

In my opinion, the concern that expanding the Court will set off a tit-for-tat battle in Congress to expand then contract the Court over and over again, is overstated. First, changing the size of the Court is well within the purview of the Constitutional powers granted to Congress, so it’s not like Court expansion would be some underhanded political trick. The Founding Fathers left it to Congress to decide how many Justices should serve on the Supreme Court and gave them the power to change that number as they saw fit.

Second, the feared tit-for-tat battle could not be waged unless the makeup of Congress and the presidency aligned perfectly. Changing the size of the Court, logistically speaking, is no easy task. Even if one party could muster enough votes in both the House and Senate, just like with any other bill, the legislation could be vetoed by the President if s/he didn’t agreed with the proposal. In that case, it would take a supermajority in Congress to override the President’s veto. No easy task.

On the other hand, if Court expansion is being proposed solely to return trust and legitimacy in the Court, I’m afraid it won’t work. At least in the short term, Court expansion is going to be viewed as a political move, further damaging the legitimacy of the Court. In other words, if Court Expansion is passed for what appear to be purely political reasons (which I think is inevitable), the American public is likely to further disapprove of the Court, tanking their already record-low approval numbers. In time, I expect that those approval numbers would increase as the nation acclimates to the new normal. But in the short-term, I believe Court expansion will hurt the Court’s legitimacy.

Like all of the reforms analyzed as part of this project, Court expansion has a downside. Even if you believe that expanding the Court is the best and/or most expedient way to save the Court, you also have to recognize that such a move is almost certain to further damage the Court’s reputation and legitimacy. It may be worth it, but Court expansion is by no means a perfect solution.

In the next installment, we’ll look at reform proposals to implement term limits on Supreme Court Justices as well as uniform appointment procedures that could guarantee that every president has a minimum of two appointments to the Supreme Court.

 

 

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Saving the Court: The Nomination and Confirmation Process (Part 4)

This is part 4 of the Saving the Court series. I would encourage you to read previous posts, including

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The Constitution gives the President the power to appoint members of the Supreme Court with the advice and consent of the Senate. Most reform proposals involve changing something about the way the Court is structured or how it operates. Surprisingly few deal with how judges are nominated and confirmed. Even the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court (PCSCOTUS) only briefly touched on the nomination and confirmation process, and that was limited to a few paragraphs in an appendix. Yet, there may be no more consequential reform than changing and improving the way Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The nomination and confirmation process is broken. Looking at a brief history of Supreme Court nominations and confirmations shows how the process has degraded over time.

For most of the history of the nation, the nomination and confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices has been a rather routine event. With few exceptions, Justices were nominated and confirmed with a minimum of drama or fanfare. This was true even when the President and the majority of the Senate represented different parties.

The first Supreme Court Justice was nominated in 1789. It was not until 1939 that a Supreme Court nominee, Felix Frankfurter, took unrestricted questions in an open setting as part of his confirmation. Nominees did not routinely sit before the Senate Judiciary Committee to answer questions until John Marshall Harlan’s nomination in 1955. These appearances mark the beginning of what we now know as the modern nomination and confirmation process.

An inflection point appears to have taken place in 1987 when President Ronald Reagan nominated Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. By all accounts, Bork was a towering legal mind with an impressive history of service as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, as Solicitor General in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and as an esteemed law professor at Yale University Law School. Even so, Bork was an outspoken critic of both the Warren and Burger Courts’ constitutional interpretations, especially as they related to First Amendment and right to privacy decisions. These decisions had been lauded by both moderates and liberals in the Senate, making Bork’s outspoken criticism unwelcome.

Bork was nominated to replace Justice Lewis Powell, a principled moderate. Democrats in the Senate warned the Reagan Administration that they would have a fight on their hands if they nominated a conservative like Bork. Reagan dismissed the warning and nominated Bork anyway.

According to Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), if the vote had been held prior to Bork testifying before the Judiciary Committee, he likely would have been confirmed. However, Bork willingly engaged with the Senators during the hearing, often lecturing them on legal points as if they were his students. He was gruff and stand-offish in his demeanor, rubbing several senators the wrong way. In the end, Bork was his own worst enemy. The Senate rejected him by a vote of 58-42, with six Republicans joining all but two Democrats to defeat the nomination.

It’s not like Bork’s rejection by the Senate was the first. Although it was rare, it did happen occasionally. In fact, in 1969 and 1970 respectively, Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell, two Nixon nominees, were both rejected. However, Bork’s rejection seemed to anger and energize Republicans. They felt stung by Bork’s rejection and saw it as a turning point in Supreme Court confirmation hearings.

Even so, the next several nominations did not cause many waves. For instance, Anthony M. Kennedy was confirmed 97-0; David H. Souter was confirmed 90-9; Ruth Bader Ginsburg was confirmed 96-3; and Stephen G. Breyer was confirmed 87-9. The votes were not particularly close.

The exception to these overwhelmingly bi-partisan confirmations of Supreme Court nominations was the 1991 nomination of Clarence Thomas, between Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Thomas was nominated to replace Thurgood Marshall, one of the Court’s most liberal Justices. Thomas was an outspoken conservative, and the wide gap between his judicial philosophy and that of Marshall was a sticking point for a lot of moderate and liberal Senators, including then-Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Joe Biden. Those differences were overshadowed by the allegations of sexual harassment leveled by Anita Hill against Thomas. The allegations gave the hearings an undignified, overly dramatic atmosphere. In the end, Thomas was confirmed 52-48. Eleven Democrats and all but two Republicans voted to confirm Thomas.

The next two nominations—Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, both nominated by Bill Clinton—went rather smoothly. This was due, in part, to both the President and the majority in the Senate being from the same party. But after Breyer’s confirmation, things drastically changed.

Beginning in 2005 with the nomination of John Roberts to replace William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, the bi-partisan nature of the confirmation process began to breakdown. The change can be seen in the confirmation votes since 2005. For instance, Roberts was confirmed 78-22 in 2005; Samuel A. Alito, Jr. was confirmed 58-42 in 2005; Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed 68-31 in 2009, Elena Kagan was confirmed 63-37 in 2010; Neil Gorsuch was confirmed 54-45 in 2017; Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed 50-48 in 2018; Amy Coney Barrett was confirmed 52-48 in 2020; and Ketanji Brown Jackson was confirmed 53-47 in 2022.Of course, not reflected in these votes was the refusal of the Republican-led Senate to even hold a hearing on President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland in 2016.

Understanding Why the Confirmation Process Has Become Dysfunctional

The breakdown of the confirmation process has been a bi-partisan endeavor. Both Republicans and Democrats have escalated the rhetoric and the political maneuvering. Each successive nomination to the Supreme Court now seems to call for increased escalation in a process that has become tit-for-tat and entirely predictable.

The question of why this is happening is difficult to answer with any precision and differs depending on who is being asked. For Republicans, the escalating confirmation process warfare began with the hearings surrounding Robert Bork’s nomination. They also still hold a grudge (although many current senators were not in the Senate at the time) over the Clarence Thomas hearings. Finally, Republican’s point to the fact that Democrats—most notably, Sen. Harry Reed (D-NV)—invoked the “Nuclear option” of not allowing use of the filibuster when it came to Executive Branch, district court, and appellate nominations. Republicans point the finger squarely at Democrats when it comes to the dysfunctional Supreme Court confirmation process.

By contrast, Democrats view the rejection of Bork’s nomination as a bi-partisan effort. Robert Bork, they feel, would have been far too conservative for the Court, especially considering who he was slated to replace. They point to the way Republicans have escalated the political maneuvering, first by invoking the nuclear option of disallowing the filibuster for Supreme Court confirmation votes, then the way that Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) used the process to his advantage by refusing to hold confirmation hearings in an election year on Obama nominee Merrick Garland. To add insult to injury for Democrats, McConnell turned around and held expedited confirmation hearings for Trump’s nominee, Amy Coney Barrett, literally weeks before a Presidential Election.

Both sides blame the other for delaying Supreme Court nominations, as well as other Presidential nominations. Both sides believe they are playing defense, protecting themselves from what they know the other party would do if given the chance. The truth is, they are both right.

It is important to remember that of the nine current Justices on the Supreme Court, six were appointed by Republican Presidents, despite Democrats winning the White House in five of the nine Presidential Elections that took place during the same timeframe as those appointments. To make matter even worse, Democrats won seven out of nine popular vote majorities in those Presidential Elections. In other words, while the country as a whole was voting overwhelmingly Democratic, Republicans were filling the Court with overwhelmingly conservative Justices. This has created a legitimacy crisis for the Court, and it is the confirmation process that is most squarely to blame for the crisis. We can either address the symptoms of the crisis with proposals to enlarge the Court, implement term limits for Justices, strip the Court of some of its jurisdiction, etc. or we can deal head-on with the nexus of the crisis: the confirmation process.

According to Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution and author of the book, Confirmation Wars: Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times, “Put simply, there would be no significant debate about court reform and enlargement today, except in certain academic circles, but for the confirmation process. There is no grave problem with the courts that requires reform. Rather, the perception of the need for change is driven by the disruption of a long-term equilibrium in the manner in which judges and Justices are named and seated on the bench.”

The prognosis is not good. If we do not treat the disease of a dysfunctional confirmation process, the escalation we have seen in the past will move outside of the confirmation process and impact the structure and procedures of the Court itself. According to Wittes:

“The simple reality is that we have run out of possible escalations within the narrow confines of the mere treatment of nominees. We have already reached the point at which a nominee can expect unanimous or near-unanimous opposition from the party not in control of the White House—irrespective of his or her qualifications. We have already reached the point at which a nominee cannot count on a vote at all in the event that the Senate is not controlled by the same party as the presidency. And we have already reached the point where a nominee can expect aggressive and swift confirmation, even late in an election year, in the event of united control—the minority’s dilatory tactics having been gutted. In other words, the work has already been done to ensure a perfectly partisan confirmation process; there are no more norms left to violate in that space. The areas remaining for escalation all involve questions outside of the four corners of that process: the number of seats available to fill on a court, for example, the jurisdiction of the courts, their budgets, and whether their judges are subject to impeachment for votes that members of Congress don’t like. Of these available battlefields, the size of the courts is the most immediately responsive to the current concern with the court’s ideological balance.”

Wittes is right. The legitimacy crisis the Supreme Court is currently facing begins, and could potentially end, with reform of the confirmation process. If the confirmation process could be reformed, there would be little need for Court enlargement, term limits for Justices, or most of the other reform proposals this paper will be examining. That’s not to say that the other reform proposals are not good ideas. On their own merits, implementation of some or all of the proposals may make sense. But when it comes to the current legitimacy crisis, only reform of the confirmation process is capable of curing the disease that has led to the crisis.

A Plan to Reform the Confirmation Process

Jeffrey Peck, former Special Counsel, General Council, and Staff Director of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1987-1992 was in an especially privileged position to view the confirmation process up close, seeing both the good and the bad. He testified before the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States and offered a reform plan that deals with five areas in particular that need to be reformed:

  1. Time frames that must be followed by the Judiciary Committee and the Senate;
  2. Scope of questioning allowed of any Supreme Court Nominee;
  3. The role the FBI can and should play in investigating a nominee’s background;
  4. The discretion the Judiciary Committee should have over the testimony of third-party witnesses; and
  5. Rules surrounding Senate consideration and vote on confirmation.

Peck’s plan was created after speaking to twenty-five different Senators or senior staff members—thirteen Republicans and twelve Democrats—who had experience with the confirmation process. The purpose of the proposed changes to Senate rules is to add uniformity to the confirmation process, make it fairer for all stakeholders, and to limit or eliminate the partisan maneuvering that has taken place in the past 25-30 years.

Below in italics is Peck’s proposal. My thoughts are listed in the “Discussion” section after each element of Peck’s proposal.

  1. Time Frames: By Standing Rule of the Senate or Rule of Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the following time frames and procedures should be adopted and implemented:

a) Hearings shall commence no sooner than 30 days and no later than 50 days after the Senate receives the nomination. If the nomination is made during a Senate recess that is longer than three days, the minimum and maximum periods shall be extended by the length of the recess.

b) The nominee’s complete written record shall be delivered to the Committee no later than 10 days before hearings begin. Delays in the production of materials shall extend the minimum and maximum periods by the length of the delay, thereby penalizing the nominating Administration for dragging its feet. The White House Counsel shall certify when production of materials has been completed.

c) The Committee shall vote on the nomination no sooner than 10 days and no later than 21 days after hearings conclude. The “official” conclusion of the hearings shall be determined by the Chair and Ranking Member; any “gaming” of the hearings for the sole purpose of extending the time frames should be avoided. The current ability of one Senator to “hold over” a nomination shall be eliminated.

d) The Committee shall be required to report the nomination to the floor in all circumstances – even with a negative recommendation or without recommendation. The Constitution places the advice and consent obligation on the Senate, not a committee of the Senate. The Judiciary Committee processes the nomination by holding hearings, preparing a report and reporting the nomination to the Senate. It should not determine the fate of the nominee.

e) The full Senate shall begin consideration of the nomination no sooner than 10 days and no later than 21 days after the Committee formally files its report on the nomination. The Senate can delay consideration only by unanimous consent.

f) The time frames in this new Rule could be shortened or lengthened “for cause” by joint agreement of the Judiciary Committee’s Chair and Ranking Member. “Cause” includes, but is not limited to, a voluminous record of the nominee due to extensive writings, speeches or opinions, the need for investigation of new matters and/or if additional relevant materials are uncovered.

g) These timeframes shall apply under all circumstances, including nominations in a presidential election year up to August 1 of that year, as explained below.

h) These new Rules could be altered only by unanimous consent of the Senate in order to eliminate the ability of the majority party to jettison the new policies for political expediency by simple majority vote.

i) These new Rules are needed now and, ideally, should be adopted and implemented immediately. Unfortunately, there is little or no chance of that occurring. Accordingly, the new Rules proposed here shall not take effect until after the next presidential election and not until the swearing in of the new Congress in January 2025. Postponing the effective date of new rules should reduce the partisanship over their deliberation and increase the likelihood of adoption because neither party would know who the rules theoretically help, and who they theoretically hurt, by the time they go into effect. 

Discussion: There are three things that stick out to me about this section of Peck’s proposal. First, the specific time frames Peck lists are badly needed. Never again should the Senate Majority Leader—just one elected official out of 100 members of the Senate—hold up a president’s nomination to the Supreme Court. By doing so, he in essence unilaterally reduced the number of sitting Supreme Court Justices from nine to eight for an entire Court calendar year. Senate rules should be implemented to make sure that no single member of the Senate can have that much power.

Second, every person nominated to the Supreme Court should get an up or down vote by members of the entire Senate. The Constitution gives the entire Senate the “advise and consent” power, which has traditionally involved a simple majority vote of all Senators. No committee, including the Judiciary Committee, should have that power.

Third, I have no problem with there being a cut-off for Supreme Court nominees during the fourth year of a president’s term. Presidential nominations to the Court made by August 1 of that final year of a President’s term seems like a reasonable date. It takes into account the amount of time the confirmation process should take while also factoring in the early voting that takes place in many states.

2. Scope of Questioning: While it is not feasible to establish a Senate or Committee Rule defining the allowable scope of questioning, the appropriate norm for questioning SCOTUS nominees – a “standard of responsiveness” – should be “philosophical particularity,” as opposed to “pinpoint specificity seeking pledges or commitments” or the “extreme reluctance” taken by more recent nominees. Procedurally, no Member of the Committee, including the Chair or Ranking Member, should be allowed to instruct a nominee not to answer a question. A Member or Members may dislike the questions posed by a colleague, but it is up to the nominee to decide whether to answer.

a) To make an informed decision and fulfill their constitutional obligation and duty to exercise “advice and consent” on judicial nominations, Senators must understand the nominee’s judicial philosophy and views on core constitutional principles.

b) The so-called “Ginsburg Rule” cited by recent nominees is neither a rule nor an appropriate tactic to utilize to deflect substantively appropriate questions. Indeed, then Judge Ginsburg did not always follow it during her hearings.

c) When presidents campaign on promises regarding the justices they will appoint to the Supreme Court, criticizing past rulings and individual Justices – as they increasingly do – the Senate can hardly sit idly by during the hearings and not probe the judicial philosophy of nominees selected to fulfill those promises and answer those critiques. Indeed, the imperative to question nominees on judicial philosophy is even greater under such circumstances.

Discussion: There is a delicate balance that takes place during confirmation hearings for nominees to the Supreme Court. Senators want to know where the nominee stands on any number of issues that are likely to be debated before the Court in the near term. On the other hand, nominees to the Court do not want to fence themselves in, indicating they’ll rule one way, but ultimately ruling another.

Ideally, questions from Senators and answers from nominees will remain in the philosophical realm and will not wander into past decisions or actual future cases. The Senate has a job to do in advising and consenting on a given nominee, and they must know a little something about the nominee’s thoughts and feelings on certain salient issues. Short of stating that ideal, the rules should not restrict a Senator from asking a certain specific-type of question nor should they prohibit a nominee from answering any given question in the way they feel most appropriate in answering. Nominees should not be encouraged to avoid questions, either by the rules or by Senators from either party.

3. The Role of the FBI. Processes pertaining to the FBI’s investigation of SCOTUS nominees should be further clarified and memorialized in a Memorandum of Understanding that updates and replaces the 2009 MOU executed by President Obama’s White House Counsel and the then Senate Judiciary Committee Chair and Ranking Member. This MOU should be adopted at the beginning of a new Congress so that it is done outside the context of any particular nomination, and should:

a) Underscore and memorialize the independence of the FBI, stating specifically that the FBI’s client is the American people. It is important to make clear, formally, that when the FBI conducts its investigations neither the White House Counsel nor the Senate Judiciary Committee majority or minority are the clients.

b) Create communication protocols governing the FBI’s dialogue with the White House and the Chair/Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee so that each of those three parties receives information simultaneously when the FBI has determined that a matter warrants investigation. It is necessary to take steps ensuring neither receives preferential treatment over the other.

c) Spell out the parameters of the FBI’s role in conducting the background investigation before the hearings begin and any subsequent investigations that arise once the hearings have started. Specifically, and working with FBI leadership, the MOU should require a more fulsome investigative process at the outset so matters that have historically come to light later in the process are more likely to be uncovered on the front end.

d) Set an expected time frame for the delivery of the FBI report for the original investigation and any subsequent investigations, with room for potential adjustments depending on the precise nature of allegations that arise. 

Discussion: The FBI has an important role to play when investigating the background of a Supreme Court nominee. The investigation should be thorough, but it should not turn into a fishing expedition, and, above all else, it should not become partisan. The Chair and the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee should set out their expectation to the FBI up front and should give the FBI a reasonable amount of time to conduct a thorough investigation.

The purpose of setting expectations up front and making sure that the Chair and Ranking member are on the same page is so we never have a repeat of what happened during the confirmation hearings for Brett Kavanaugh, when Republicans tried to limit the scope of the FBI’s investigation into charges of sexual assault against Kavanaugh at the same time Democrats were calling for an expansion of the investigation. The FBI should remain independent, and the Memorandum of Understanding should do everything possible to make certain they do not get stuck in the middle of a partisan squabble.

4. Third Party Witnesses: Qualitative or quantitative limits on the live testimony of third-party witnesses should not be established by rule.

a) The Supreme Court plays a vital role in our nation and third-party witnesses should have the opportunity not only to submit written statements for the record but also testify in person.

b) A norm should be established whereby the majority of outside witnesses should provide well-informed assessments of the record of the nominee.

c) The Chair and Ranking Member should utilize their joint discretion, as they do in all hearings, to manage the number of witnesses.

d) The American Bar Association should no longer play the dominant role it has in reviewing nominees. The Committee should place equal weight on multiple bar associations without affording a lead role to any single one.

Discussion: I agree with Peck’s position on third-party witnesses. The Chair and Ranking Member should have discretion over who and how many parties they allow to testify live versus submitting written testimony. A wide cross-section of Americans should have a say in who is confirmed to the Supreme Court. However, time is limited and only the most relevant third-party presenters should be allowed to appear live as part of a confirmation hearing.

5. Senate Consideration and Vote on Confirmation: If we had the good fortune to write on a blank slate, Senate Rules should require 60 votes to confirm a Supreme Court Justice in order to force, at least in most circumstances, a bipartisan consensus not only on the back end, for the final vote, but also on the front end, by necessitating more consultation by the president with the minority party leadership in the Senate. But the slate is not blank; far from it. It is inconceivable that Democrats will restore a 60-vote margin for SCOTUS nominees after a Republican president and Republican Senate confirmed one-third of the Justices sitting today by majority vote. Bipartisan consensus on this issue is simply not attainable. Accordingly, I recommend:

a) The Senate should retain the current simple majority requirement for confirming Supreme Court nominees.

b) The Senate should add a new Rule explicitly requiring that all nominees receive a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, a Committee vote and an up-or-down vote on the merits in the Senate. No nominee should be refused consideration unless the nomination has been withdrawn.

c) The Senate should consider all nominations in a presidential election year except for those made after August 1. Nominations before August 1 are likely to be completed prior to Election Day in a balanced and orderly manner. Given the time frames proposed for new Rules guiding the Judiciary Committee’s consideration, nominations after August 1 are not likely to be considered thoroughly and fairly before the American people select the next president. Key steps by the Administration and the Senate – including document production, requests for more investigative work by the FBI, number of third-party witnesses and the like – are more likely to be colored by politics and game-playing when taking place within 90 days of a presidential election. Fairness and responsible decision-making will ensue when presidential politics is not the main driver.

d) Using August 1 as a cut-off date in a presidential election year also takes into account the early voting – either by mail or in-person – that many states now allow. There are few more consequential decisions made in our nation than placing one of nine Justices with life tenure on the Supreme Court. Doing so while tens of millions of Americans are voicing their preference about the next president is anti-democratic.

e) Despite the August 1 cut-off date, any Senator who believes nominations made before that date in a presidential election year are still too close to Election Day can vote against the nomination solely for that reason.

f) While not likely feasible to implement by Senate rule, the two parties should share an understanding that nominations made by a lame duck president after his or her defeat on Election Day will not be considered.

Discussion: I disagree with Peck’s contention that Supreme Court nominees should be confirmed by at least 60 members of the Senate. There are two reasons for my position.

First, requiring 60 votes gives the minority the ability to control Supreme Court confirmations, giving their “no” votes more weight than the “yes” votes of the majority. Rather than encouraging bi-partisanship, I fear that it will create gridlock, and could potentially throw the Supreme Court into chaos.

Second, the 60-vote requirement would simply be institutionalizing the filibuster under another name. In specific areas throughout the Constitution, the Founders chose to require a supermajority vote, such as Presidential veto overrides, Constitutional amendments, and treaty ratification. They did not make a supermajority vote requirement to confirm Supreme Court Justices and we should not raise the bar in this regard now.

Of course, Peck concedes that requiring 60 votes now is not realistic, so he drops the requirement. I agree with him that it is unrealistic, but I also believe it is unnecessary and unwise.

 

Implementing these changes to the nomination and confirmation process would help to fix many of the ills creating the Court’s legitimacy crisis. In my next post, I’ll tackle one of the most popular Supreme Court reform proposals: expanding the size of the Court.

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Saving the Court: A History of Supreme Court Reform Efforts (Part 3)

This is part 3 of the Saving the Court series. I would encourage you to read previous posts, including

In this post, I’ll examine the history of Supreme Court reform efforts, beginning with the earliest days of the Court right up until present day.

Constitutional Language

Article III, § I of the United States Constitution creates the Supreme Court and grants to Congress the right to create other courts as they see fit. It reads:

“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”

Article III, § II of the Constitution delineates the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which includes:

  • Cases involving the United States Constitution and treaties,
  • Cases affecting ambassadors and diplomats, and
  • Cases involving admiralty and maritime law.

Finally, Article II, § II grants to the Executive the power to appoint Justices to the Supreme Court and other courts that Congress may create, with the advice and consent of the Senate. “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” 

Federalist 78 and Brutus XV

In 1788, Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pseudonym “Publius,” in Federalist 78, offered some additional thoughts on the judicial branch of the proposed government.

“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” (Emphasis added)

Hamilton saw the judiciary as an intermediary between the people and the Congress, whose role, among other things, was to keep Congress within the authority assigned to it by the Constitution. Not everyone agreed, and a hearty public debate ensued regarding the judiciary and its relation to the other branches of government, as well as to the people.

By contrast, Robert Yates, an anti-federalist, writing as “Brutus” in Brutus XV, wrote that the framers of the Constitution followed the British by making federal judges independent by granting them their positions during good behavior, but then failed to follow the British model of “instituting a tribunal in which their errors may be corrected.” In other words, Yates felt that the framers had made a grave error in giving judges lifetime appointments (“during good Behaviour”) without also giving the legislature the power to override judicial decision they disagreed with. For Yates, the framers were setting up a government where the judiciary ruled over and controlled the legislative branch, as well as a judiciary that was disconnected from and unaccountable to the people.

“I do not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behaviour. I suppose it a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible. But I say, this system has followed the English government in this, while it has departed from almost every other principle of their jurisprudence, under the idea, of rendering the judges independent; which, in the British constitution, means no more than that they hold their places during good behaviour, and have fixed salaries, they have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to controul any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.” 

History of Supreme Court Reform Efforts

When the new government began operating on March 4, 1789, many questions remained, including questions surrounding the judiciary. Article III established the Supreme Court, but the drafters of the Constitution were unable to agree on the creation of inferior courts, what types of cases the federal courts would hear, how the Supreme Court would relate to state courts, and how many Justices would sit on the Supreme Court. Rather than coming to an agreement, in what has come to be known as the “Madisonian Compromise,” the drafters left it to Congress to decide these issues.

The first Congress, which convened in New York in April 1789, immediately set to work crafting legislation to establish the federal courts. A Senate Committee made up of ten senators drafted an act that was then circulated to top lawyers, jurists, and leaders of the day for input. The Senate then set about creating a compromise bill that attempted to balance the concerns of the Federalists, who favored a strong federal judiciary, with those of the Anti-Federalists, who wanted to assure state autonomy. After debate, and several rounds of amendments, the resulting bill passed both the Senate and the House. On September 24, President George Washington signed the Judiciary Act of 1789 into law.

The Act established a six Justice Supreme Court consisting of one Chief Justice and five associate Justices. It also set out the Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, and it placed the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy of the nation’s courts, including superior to state courts. In addition, the Act established thirteen federal district courts, one for each state, as well as one each for Maine and Kentucky, which had not yet become states. Each district court was staffed by one district judge with jurisdiction primarily over admiralty cases and minor federal crimes. The Act also established three circuit courts—eastern, middle, and southern—which were each staffed by a circuit court judge and two Supreme Court Justices who were expected to “ride circuit” to the outlying courts. Both the district court and the circuit courts were primarily trial courts, although the circuit courts were given limited appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court first convened on February 2, 1790, at New York’s Royal Exchange. Chief Justice John Jay gaveled to order the Court, which on that day consisted of just three associate Justices. Two others were unable to attend. Even before the Supreme Court first convened, Congress was already debating reform proposals that sought to restructure it, alter its jurisdiction, and further empower inferior federal courts. More often than not, the reform efforts came up short, but that didn’t stop Congress, or the public, from proposing changes to the judiciary.

The first reform proposal to actually become law was the Judiciary Act of 1801. The Act made several changes to the judiciary, including expanding the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts to allow them to hear all cases arising under federal law; increased the number of district and circuit courts, including adding a new sixth circuit; created sixteen new circuit judgeships; and ended the circuit-riding duties of Supreme Court Justices. The number of Supreme Court Justices was reduced to five upon the next vacancy, which was nominally justified because Justices would no longer have to ride circuit, meaning fewer Justices were needed. However, the truth is it was almost certainly done for political reasons.

Sitting President John Adams, a Federalist, was not running for re-election, so Congress, where Federalists were a majority, did not want to risk a President from another party having the ability to add a Justice to the Supreme Court. However, contrary to popular belief, the change in the number of Supreme Court Justices was not motivated by Thomas Jefferson’s Presidential victory. In fact, the Act was debated and passed months before Jefferson and his fellow Democratic-Republicans swept into office.

After just one year, the Judiciary Act of 1801—along with nearly all of its reforms—was repealed and replaced by the Judiciary Act of 1802. The new Act reversed everything the Act of 1801 implemented, with the exception of adding a sixth circuit. The number of Supreme Court Justices was restored to six, and for the first time, the number of Justices corresponded to the number of federal circuits.

Marbury v. Madison

William Marbury was one of forty-two people appointed as a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia and Alexandria, Virginia by President Adams in the waning days of his administration. All appointees were confirmed by the Senate, and all but four of those appointments were processed by John Marshall, who was serving simultaneously as Secretary of State and as the newly confirmed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

When Thomas Jefferson became the third President of the United States, he instructed his new Secretary of State, James Madison, to hold all commissions that had not yet been processed. One of those four appointments was for William Marbury, who ultimately sued under a writ of mandamus, asking the Court to force Madison to deliver his commission.

In Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), the Court decided that it could not grant the petitioner’s request because the law that gave the Court jurisdiction to rule in the case was itself unconstitutional. Chief Justice John Marshall spoke for the Court, establishing the Court’s authority to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. Neither the Constitution nor legislation gives the Court this power explicitly. Instead, Marshall found that the Constitution implicitly gave the power of judicial review to the Court.

Although the Constitution does not specifically confer the power of judicial review on the Court, Chief Justice Marshall (and others) saw in the combined force of Article III, The Supremacy Clause of Article VI, longstanding Anglo-American legal practice, and the nature of the United States Constitution, that judicial review was within the Court’s power. “Chief Justice Marshall established judicial review as a principle of American law, claiming for the Court—in the name of the Constitution and the people—the power ‘to say what the law is.” (Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court Of The United States 2021, 41)

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” (Marbury v. Madison 1803)

Post-Marbury Efforts to Reform the Supreme Court

In 1807, the number of Justices was once again increased to seven to correspond with the addition of a seventh federal circuit. If it wasn’t obvious previously, it became obvious in 1807 that the number of Supreme Court Justices and the number of federal circuits were understood as necessarily linked.

As the country grew and expanded westward, the need for additional federal courts expanded. The Judiciary Act of 1837 increased by two the number of federal circuits, as well as the number of Supreme Court Justices. While the addition of circuits was needed, the timing was purely political. The Democratic Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1837 on March 3, 1837, the final day of President Andrew Jackson’s term in office, giving Jackson the opportunity to appoint two additional Justices before he returned home to Tennessee.

The succession of slave-holding states and the beginning of the Civil War prompted further reform of the judiciary. Not only was the country at war, but half of the Justices on the Supreme Court at the time were from southern states. President Abraham Lincoln knew he had to make changes to the Judiciary in order to make the Court more friendly to his agenda.

In an 1861 address, President Lincoln contended that the country had outgrown its present judicial system, and he called for Congress to sever the link between the number of circuits and the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. Congress only partially followed Lincoln’s lead. As requested, in 1862 and 1863, Congress reorganized and increased the number of federal circuits to ten. But rather than accede to Lincoln’s wishes, they also added a tenth seat to the Supreme Court.

In 1866, with the Civil War ended and the country reunited, Congress once again undertook court reform. With the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, the Republican majority in Congress reduced the number of circuits from ten to nine and mandated that the number of Supreme Court Justices be gradually reduced from ten to seven. This not only de-coupled the traditional linkage between the number of circuits and the number of Supreme Court Justices, it also accomplished the political goal of preventing incoming President Andrew Johnson, a Democrat, from appointing any Justices to the Court.

In the years during and shortly after the Civil War, the federal judiciary experienced a profound expansion of jurisdiction. The most important changes were:

  1. Removal Jurisdiction – Allowed certain cases that began in state court to be taken to federal court;
  2. Writ of Habeas Corpus – Allowed federal courts to issue writs on behalf of prisoners held by state authorities in violation of federal law; and
  3. Federal Question – Also known as “arising under” jurisdiction.

As a result, in 1890, the Supreme Court was inundated with cases. The number of cases rose from 310 in 1860 to more than 1800 just thirty years later. Calls for reform to the Court were plentiful, with proposals for an 18-member Court, a new level of federal appellate court, and splitting the Supreme Court into three divisional panels among the recommendations.

In 1891, Congress passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, also known as the “Evarts Act.” While resisting calls to increase the size of the Supreme Court, the Act eliminated the duty of Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit, and created intermediate courts of appeal, which drastically reduced the case load of the Supreme Court.

Calls for reforms continued, and in 1912, in his campaign for the presidency, Theodore Roosevelt proposed a new law that would give the people the power to overrule court decisions that found legislation unconstitutional. Due to pushback, Roosevelt limited his reform recommendation to just state courts, but behind closed doors, he confided that he’d like the reform measure to apply to federal courts as well.

Roosevelt’s campaign proved unsuccessful, but progressive members of Congress continued to push the idea of recalling court decisions. Senator Robert Owen (D-OK) proposed legislation that would allow Congress to remove lower federal court judges and Supreme Court Justices with a simple majority vote, and Senator Robert LaFollette (R-WI) proposed a Constitutional amendment that would allow Congress to override court decisions that invalidated legislation. Neither proposal succeeded, but they are both illustrative of the ongoing debate over reforms of the judiciary.

FDR’s Court Packing Plan

Perhaps the most famous Court reform proposal—at least when it comes to increasing the size of the Court—occurred in 1937 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. To fully understand Roosevelt’s plan to transform the Court, it’s necessary to put it into context.

Roosevelt was elected to the presidency in 1932 while the United States was in the throes of the Great Depression. In campaigning for the nation’s highest office, Roosevelt promised Americans a “New Deal” designed to boost the national economy and reverse the depression that had gripped the nation. The plan called for greater government involvement in the economy than had been common previously.

After being elected, Roosevelt and the 73rd Congress passed the Economy Act, a relatively minor piece of legislation that may have had a big impact. The Economy Act cut many government salaries, including cutting in half the pensions received by retired Supreme Court Justices. The lower retirement benefits resulted in Supreme Court Justices William Van Devanter and George Sutherland each curtailing their retirement plans.

There’s no way to know for certain if the Economy Act led Van Deventer, Sutherland, or other Justices to hold a grudge against Roosevelt, although some scholars have posited that it did play a role. In the very least, the Economy Act kept Justices on the Court that were unfriendly to the President’s legislative agenda, and prohibited him from appointing more sympathetic Justices.

The Supreme Court in the early and mid-1930s was made up of four conservative Justices (Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, James Clark McReynolds, and Pierce Butler), known as “The Four Horsemen;” three liberal Justices (Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske Stone), dubbed the “Three Musketeers”; and two “swing votes” (Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Owen Roberts). Early in Roosevelt’s tenure, the Court was decidedly opposed to the President’s New Deal legislation.

In 1935, the Court ruled against Roosevelt in:

  • Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company (295 U.S. 330) – Case challenging the constitutionality of the compulsory retirement and pension system for all carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act;
  • Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (295 U.S. 602) — Case regarding whether or not the President had the authority to remove executive officials of a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial administrative bodies for reasons other than those allowed by Congress;
  • Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford (295 U.S. 555) – Case involving the constitutionality of the Frazier-Lempke Farm Bankruptcy Act;
  • Schechter Poultry Company v. United States (295 U.S. 495) – Case involving the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933; and
  • United States v. Butler (297 U.S. 1) – Case involving the taxing power of the federal government that found the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional.

The decisions in Humphrey’s Executor, Louisville Joint Stock Bank, and Schechter Poultry Company were all announced on what has come to be known as “Black Monday” (May 27, 1935), and all decisions were 9-0.

Roosevelt was angry. Not only did he feel that these decisions were rendered out of spite, but he feared that the Court stood in the way of him fully implementing his New Deal legislation, a prospect he believed would further damage the country’s economy.

In November 1936, Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory in the Presidential Election, cementing his mandate to move forward with more New Deal legislation. One month later, in December 1936, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (300 U.S. 379). The case involved the constitutionality of a minimum wage law and was very important to the future of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.

The President feared that the Court would continue to block his legislation, so on February 5, 1937, he introduced the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, which became known colloquially as the “Court packing” plan. On March 9, 1937, Roosevelt justified his plan in a Fireside Chat.

Roosevelt claimed that his plan to expand the Court was designed to relieve overcrowded court dockets. In reality, Court expansion was a way for Roosevelt to head off his concerns that the Court would strike down his Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Social Security Act, legislation he and the Democrats in Congress had fought so hard to pass.

Roosevelt’s plan called for the addition of one Supreme Court Justice, up to a maximum of fifteen, for every one that stayed on the Court for six months past their seventieth birthday. This plan encouraged, but did not require, Justices to retire when they reached an age that is usually associated with a slower lifestyle and, in some cases, reduced mental capabilities. The plan, if approved, would have allowed Roosevelt to add six Justices, since Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Butler were all past their seventieth birthdays.

Following Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat, support for his Court expansion plan received lukewarm support among voters, and bi-partisan opposition in Congress. Although Roosevelt’s Court expansion legislation was stalled in Congress, things in the Court started to break Roosevelt’s way. On March 29, 1937—which came to be known as “White Monday”—the Court handed down three decisions that bolstered Roosevelt’s New Deal effort.

  • West Coast Hotel Co. V. Parrish (300 U.S. 379) – The Court upheld the constitutionality of minimum wage legislation;
  • Wright v. Vinton Branch (300 U.S. 440) – The Court upheld the constitutionality of the newly passed Frazier-Lempke Act as it concerned farmer bankruptcy; and
  • Virginian Railway Co. v. Federation (300 U.S. 515) – The Court upheld the constitutionality of the revamped Railway Labor Act.

History has concocted a narrative, commonly known as the “switch in time that saved nine,” that had Justice Roberts changing his vote in an attempt to defeat Roosevelt’s Court packing plan. The truth is, Roberts voiced his desire to support the constitutionality of minimum wage laws once oral arguments in the Parrish case were complete, months before Roosevelt introduced his Court packing plan. In other words, Roberts’ vote was based on his judicial philosophy, not political expediency.

Justice Van Devanter retired in May 1937 allowing Roosevelt to appoint a Justice to the Court friendly to his legislation. With Van Devanter gone and Roberts voting with the Court’s liberal wing, the President’s New Deal legislation was safe. In addition, the Court packing plan, which was never passed into law, became a footnote in history.

Post-World War II Court Reform Efforts

In 1956, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483), several Constitutional amendments were proposed to try to undo what the Court had done in Brown. Among the proposals was an amendment making the Senate the final court of appeal and giving it the authority to review decisions of the Supreme Court; an amendment setting term limits for federal judges; a procedure that allowed Court decisions that weakened states’ rights to be overturned if one-fourth of the states disapproved; a “Court of the Union” made up of state supreme court judges with the power to review and overturn decisions made by the Supreme Court involving states rights; and an amendment reserving to the states the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the public schools of the various states. None of these proposals were passed.

In 1963 and 1964, the Court heard a series of six cases—known collectively as the Reapportionment cases—that involved the makeup of legislative districts in various states. The Court’s decisions effectively invalidated the legislative districts in every state. Rather than being apportioned by political subdivisions, such as the county, the Court said that the districts had to be based on equal population districts. In the aftermath of the decisions, Illinois senator Everett Dirksen led a movement to amend the Constitution to allow the Senate to override Supreme Court decisions, but the effort ultimately fell short.

During the Democratic Party Primary leading up to the 2020 Presidential Election, court reform became a hot topic again. Democrats felt that Republicans had stolen at least one, maybe two, Supreme Court nominations from them, and they were anxious to support just about any proposal that would help turn the tables. Candidates such as Sen. Kamala Harris (D-CA), Mayor Pete Buttigieg, and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) were all open to adding seats to the Supreme Court and applying term limits to Supreme Court Justices. For his part, Candidate Joe Biden refused to support either expanding the Court or term limits. Instead, he committed to creating a commission of legal experts to study the various reform proposals to see if any of them could or should be implemented. It’s highly likely that forming a committee to study the issue was a way for Biden to avoid committing to any particular course of action. Regardless, he was good to his word, and on April 9, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14023 establishing the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States.

Throughout our nation’s history—in fact, starting before the Supreme Court even opened for business—there have been calls for reforms to the judiciary generally, and the Supreme Court specifically. The reforms we consider today are not new. What is new is the highly partisan Court, as well as the highly partisan nomination and confirmation process. In the next post, I’ll look at the nomination and confirmation process, and examine proposals to make it fairer and more effective.

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Saving the Court: How We Got Into This Mess (Part 2)

This is part 2 of the Saving the Court series. I would encourage you to read previous posts, including:

 

In this post, I’ll examine how we got into the situation we find ourselves in today. It started several years ago, and has only gotten worse over time.

——————–

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia died in his sleep on February 13, 2016, at the Cibolo Creek Ranch in Shafter, Texas. Scalia was at the ranch at the invitation of John Poindexter, a businessman and owner of the ranch, to hunt quail. The arrangement was a bit unusual. One of Poindexter’s subsidiary companies, the Mic Group, had recently been before the Supreme Court in an age discrimination case. The Court had denied certiorari, securing the Mic Group’s victory in the lower court.

Scalia’s death set off a chain of explosive events that transformed the Supreme Court over the following four years and raised calls for Court reform. But it was not the ethical implications of Scalia’s death that led to the upheaval. Instead, it was the actions taken by the Senate in the aftermath of the Justice’s death that reconfigured and set off a political firestorm that still rages today.

When Scalia died, President Barack Obama had just begun the final year of his second term in office. The 2016 Presidential Election was nearly nine months away, and Obama’s term would not end for another eleven months. Obama nominated Merrick Garland, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to replace Scalia. Garland was considered a centrist, and he was well-respected in legal circles, having received the American Bar Association’s highest rating.

By all accounts, Garland was about as good a nominee as the Republicans in the Senate could have hoped for from a Democratic President. He was not the extreme liberal some had feared. Even so, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) notified President Obama that the Senate would not take up the nomination of Garland. His public justification for refusing to hold hearings on Garland’s nomination was that voters should have a voice in who is nominated to the nation’s highest court by casting their ballot in the upcoming Presidential Election. Privately, McConnell knew that no one could force him to consider Garland’s nomination. For him, that was justification enough.

Article II, § 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution gives the President the power to appoint Justices of the Supreme Court, with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Traditionally, even if the majority party in the Senate was not in favor of a nominee, they would carry out their “advise and consent” duty. What McConnell did in refusing to even consider the President’s nomination so far in advance of the next Presidential Election was unprecedented. Democrats screamed foul, and the President continued to push his nominee. McConnell was unmoved. He knew that neither the President nor Democrats in the Senate could force him into scheduling hearings on Garland’s nomination.

McConnell waited out Obama, and in November 2016, Donald J. Trump was elected President. Less than a month into his first year in office, Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch, a conservative jurist serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth District, to replace Scalia. Although many Democrats voted against Gorsuch because they felt Garland was the rightful nominee, Trump’s nominee was nonetheless approved 54-45 by the Senate.

When Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement in June 2018, Trump had the opportunity to appoint another Justice to the Supreme Court. This time he selected Brett Kavanaugh, a judge serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing turned into a spectacle. College Professor Christine Blasey Ford accused Kavanaugh of sexually assaulting her in 1982 when they were both in high school. Democrats lamented the White House’s refusal to provide hundreds of thousands of documents pertinent to Kavanaugh’s record, and complained that the Department of Justice failed to fully investigate charges leveled against Kavanaugh. Protesters interrupted the proceedings screaming “Women’s rights are human rights” and “Protect women, be a hero.” As for Kavanaugh, he adamantly defended himself from sexual assault charges, and unequivocally confessed his love for beer. Even by modern day standards, the hearing was highly charged and highly partisan. In the end, Kavanaugh was confirmed, and Republicans added another conservative to the Court.

With Neil Gorsuch replacing Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court saw one conservative Justice replace another. Kavanaugh’s replacement of Kennedy was a little different. Kennedy was a swing vote, sometimes siding with conservatives, sometimes with the liberal wing of the Court. Kavanaugh, on the other hand, has proven to be a reliable conservative vote. To Democrats’ dismay and Republicans’ joy, the Court was becoming more conservative.

Then, on September 18, 2020, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died following a long battle with cancer. The diminutive Ginsburg was a liberal titan known for her fiery dissenting opinions. Her death was a worst-case scenario for Democrats and liberal Court watchers. For years, they had hoped, even encouraged, Ginsburg to retire so President Obama could appoint a replacement. Their fear was that Ginsburg, who was elderly and in failing health, would die during a Republican administration, allowing the President to replace her with a conservative Justice.

Of course, Democrats’ worst fears were realized when Ginsburg passed away during the waning days of the Trump Administration. When she died, the 2020 Presidential Election was less than two months away. Polls were not looking good for President Trump, and Republicans feared he would lose the November election.  Of course, Mitch McConnell had set a precedent in 2016 when he refused to hold confirmation hearings on Merrick Garland, Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, because a Presidential Election was coming up later that same year. Now, there were less than two months until the election.

It did not matter. As mourners gathered to pay tribute to Ginsburg on the evening of her death, and President Trump was on Air Force One returning from a campaign rally in Minnesota, McConnell sprang into action. He contacted the President to inform him that the Senator would be issuing a statement announcing Ginsburg’s seat would be filled as quickly as possible, and he encouraged the President to nominate Amy Coney Barrett.

Democrats were apoplectic. How could McConnell agree to hold hearings on a Supreme Court nominee less than two months before an election, especially after how he justified not holding hearings on Garland? McConnell absorbed the accusations of hypocrisy and moved forward with the confirmation hearings. Barrett was confirmed and the Supreme Court stood at six conservative and three liberal Justices. At a time when national politics were moving leftward and voters were about to elect a Democrat to the White House by an overwhelming margin, the Supreme Court was solidly conservative, and it appeared it would remain that way for years to come.

This phenomenon—society moving left while the Supreme Court moves right—does not bode well for the future. When voters hold one set of political beliefs while the highest court in the land rules based on a different, even opposite, set of beliefs, the Supreme Court loses its legitimacy.

To put a slightly finer point on this idea that popular opinion is moving in an opposite direction from the opinion of the Court, it is important to remember that five of the six conservative Justices (Roberts and Alito appointed by George W. Bush, and Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett appointed by Donald J. Trump) were appointed by Presidents who lost the popular vote. Additionally, four of the six conservative Justices (Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) were confirmed by Senators who combined, represented less than half of the U.S. population.

To make matters worse, the confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices has become completely dysfunctional. It was not that long ago that confirmation of a President’s Supreme Court nominee, except in rare instances, was a given. It was common for Senators from both parties to support the nominee to the Court. In recent years, the opposite has been true. Drama routinely surrounds the nomination, and the confirmation vote is more often than not played out along party lines.

Charges of judges “playing politics” and staying beyond their most productive years have also been leveled. Prominent scholars accuse Supreme Court Justices of naked partisanship, and they caution that the Court is turning into a “supreme gerontocracy,” where members stay on the bench into their years of “mental decrepitude.”

All of these issues add up to a Court that is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. But is the legitimacy crisis aimed at the Supreme Court writ large or is it a crisis that only afflicts the current makeup of the Court?

I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court as an institution enjoys wide-spread support; what is often referred to as diffuse support. Generally speaking, Americans like having a high court that makes final decisions on legal issues.

In fact, Judge Irving Kaufman wrote an essay in 1984 that spoke to the public’s willingness to accept and honor Court decisions, even when they disagree with those decisions, provided the Court’s decision makes it clear that the majority was acting in good faith. “When, in the public mind, the Court is functioning as an apolitical, wise and impartial tribunal, the people of our nation – even those citizens to whom the results may be anathema – have evinced a willingness to abide by its decisions.” What goes unsaid is that the public will not accept and honor decisions made by the Court that are political, unwise, or partisan in nature. That appears to be where we are with today’s Court.

So, we’re dealing with a Court that, as an institution, enjoys wide support from the American public. But the make up of this particular Court–the individual Justices as opposed to the institution–is currently experiencing record high disapproval ratings.

What’s to be done? Most observers agree that some reforms need to be made to the Court. Of course, there is a wide disparity of opinion about which reforms should be implemented. In the coming weeks, I’ll examine the various reform proposals and do my best to determine which will help restore the Court’s legitimacy, and which won’t. As I do, I will do my best to keep two caveats in mind:

 Caveat #1: Don’t Let Perfect Be the Enemy of Good

All too often, analysis of proposals to reform the Supreme Court are focused more on the problems with those proposals than with the problems that already exist with the Court. To be certain, it is important to examine the pros and cons of any proposal, but it is equally important to recognize that the Supreme Court currently suffers from serious issues. We cannot fix those problems if we hold out for the perfect solution. The truth is, there are no solutions—no reform proposals—that do not suffer from issues of their own. If there were, we would have implemented them long ago. None of the reform proposals examined herein come without a downside. Even so, I will endeavor to judge these proposals on their merits rather than dismissing them because they are not perfect solutions.

Caveat #2: Supreme Court Decisions Are Not Divinely Inspired

Let me offer one further caveat. The Supreme Court is often viewed as sacrosanct. The Presidency and Congress are obviously political. They both often ooze partisanship. Not so with the Supreme Court, at least not on the surface. We want to view the Supreme Court as being above the partisan fray, and we want to view their decisions as above reproach. Sadly, neither is true.

First, although Supreme Court Justices are not elected, they are nominated and confirmed as part of a political process. The political leanings of the Justices are very much germane to whether or not they get nominated and confirmed. Granted, the politics of the individual members of the Court are normally not out on display for everyone to see, but their political beliefs still play an important role in the job they do on the Court.

Second, Justices of the Supreme Court are human. Like anyone else, they have their flaws and foibles, their strengths and weaknesses. We would like to think that their decisions are infallible, but they are not. As Justice Scalia famously said in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health (497 U.S. 261) (1990) (Scalia, J. , concurring), “nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory” are no less all-knowing or insightful than the Justices of the Supreme Court.

To put it another way, Supreme Court decisions are not divinely inspired. They are the work of human beings who do the best they can, but often fall short. Members are not omnipotent, and we should not expect them to be. However, we should endeavor to structure the Court and implement policies for it that get us as close to omnipotence as possible, recognizing that we will never fully realize that goal.

Before jumping into the various reform proposals, in the next post, I want to spend some time reviewing the history of Supreme Court reform efforts to better understand what reforms have been tried before, and what might be possible in the future.

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Saving the Court: A New Project

The Supreme Court term ended this past week with the announcement of several controversial decisions. Along with the end of the term came word that the court’s approval rating had hit an all-time low. To be sure, Americans are not supportive of many of the decisions being made by the court. But more importantly, they are not happy with the way the court is reaching those decisions, or how the justices are conducting themselves outside of court.

This is an important distinction. In recent months, Chief Justice John Roberts and a few of the associate Justices, have bemoaned the fact that the Court’s approval rating has plummeted, commenting that it is the Court’s job to make difficult decisions and that the public should not lose faith in the court simply because they don’t agree with the decisions. However, the Justices are smart enough to understand that it isn’t their decisions that are creating a legitimacy crisis for the court. It is the way those decisions are being reached, as well as revelations of serious ethical lapses by a handful of Justices who have used their positions on the Court to enrich themselves.

For instance, during this past term, the court ruled on one dispute where the respondents likely did not have standing to bring the case (Biden v Nebraska). In that case, involving student loan forgiveness promulgated by the Department of Education under the HEROES Act, the organizations that brought the original suit were not impacted by the Act and did not suffer any damages as a result of its pending implementation. Even so, the majority overlooked this fact and ruled on the case anyway, giving the appearance that that the majority felt the ends justified the means, even if that meant overlooking a crucial flaw in the case.

In another case, 303 Creative v Colorado, there was no actual dispute. The entire case was hypothetical and was based on a lie. The plaintiff, Lorie Smith, was a web developer who was considering adding wedding websites to her business’s offerings. Importantly, she had never actually created any wedding websites. She feared that if she expanded her business, she might be called on to make a website for a same-sex wedding, something she opposed. She claimed that she had received a request from a man who was potentially interested in having her design a website for him and his future husband. However, when journalists reached out to the man who allegedly sent the request, they found out that not only had he not sent it, but he was married to a woman and had been for 15 years. Again, the majority ignored the facts in order to reach a decision that corresponded with their deeply held political beliefs. As Justice Elena Kagan wrote in her dissent, not only was the case not ripe for adjudication by the court, but it was actually unconstitutional for the court to rule on it.

And in the affirmative action case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, Justices in the majority were utterly intellectually dishonest in their opinion, justifying it with half-truths and inaccurate history. It wasn’t the decision that rubbed people the wrong way, although they certainly disagreed with it. It was more the dishonest way the Court reached the decision. To many observers, it was obvious that the majority’s decision was based on politics more than law.

In addition to the Justices’ tortured, partisan logic in these cases, revelations of unethical behavior by many of the justices has helped create the collapse of trust in the court. Pro Publica reported on Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito, the Court’s two most extreme conservative justices, accepting private air travel, exotic yacht vacations, and expensive lodging at exclusive resorts from billionaires who had business before the Court.

In Thomas’ case, he also allowed his benefactor to pay for his grand-nephew’s private school tuition and purchase his mother’s home, while letting her live there rent-free, and then failing to report the gifts. In addition, far right political donor Leonard Leo funneled money to Thomas’ wife, Ginni, and went to great lengths to conceal the payments. Again, Thomas failed to disclose the money paid to his wife.

Justice Neil Gorsuch sold a piece of land he had been unable to sell for two years, to an attorney who routinely practiced before the court, just nine days after being sworn in as a Justice. Gorsuch failed to report the identity of the buyer on his government ethics disclosure form.

And the Chief Justice’s wife was paid more than $10 million to act as a recruiter for high-powered law firms that practice before the Court. While this behavior, as well as the behavior involving the other Justices may have been technically legal, it’s ethically questionable, and it most certainly creates the appearance of wrong-doing, especially when the Justice’s themselves fail to report it.

I have been observing the Court for several years. In fact, while studying for a master’s degree in political science, my emphasis was on the Supreme Court, particularly in efforts to reform it. I’ve never seen a Court that was so broken and which had so lost the trust of the American people. Polls conducted by Quinnipiac and Marquette University Law School confirm that the Court’s approval rating is lower now than at any time in the past.

There are lots of reasons for this sad fact. First, the way that the court was built, using highly unusual political maneuvering to prevent a Democratic President from appointing Justices and instead handing that privilege to a  Republican President, make those appointments illegitimate in the eyes of a lot of Court observers’. The fact that the electorate as a whole has become more liberal at the same time the Court has become more conservative has also helped to damage the public’s perception of the Court.

The ethical problems experienced by several of the Justices is another reason that the Court’s legitimacy has been called into question. There has been one revelation after another of Justice’s using their position for personal gain.

And finally, the perception that the Court’s conservative wing has used the Court to implement their own political agenda, manipulating cases on the way to achieve that goal, has created a collapse of trust and a crisis of legitimacy for the Court, and by extension, for our nation. According to an ABC News poll conducted in early July 2023, 53% of respondents said they felt the Court was making decisions based on politics rather than the law. Think about that.  Based on the poll, more than half of citizens feel the Court is following politics rather than the law when reaching decisions that impact the daily lives of millions of Americans. That is the epitome of a legitimacy crisis for the Court.

In order to save the Court, reforms are needed. Most people agree with this statement. What they don’t agree on is which reforms are needed or how those reforms should be implemented. Over the next several weeks, I’m going to take a look at proposed Court reforms, examine the arguments for and against those reforms, and give you my opinion on which ones, if any, should be implemented. As much as possible, I will keep politics out of the discussion. Instead, my focus will be on how, if at all, the proposed reform can rebuild trust in the Court and restore legitimacy to the institution and it’s decisions.

In the next post, I’ll look at how we got to this point. I want to make sure everyone understands how we ended up in our current predicament. In the weeks to follow, I’ll look at several proposed reforms that have been offered to fix the Court and restore it to a trusted, indispensable part of our federal government.

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What is Juneteenth?

What is Juneteenth all about? I’m glad you asked. In a word, Juneteenth is about freedom.

“Freedom is the goal for everyone. Not just black people. Not just Texans. Freedom for everyone.” — Opal Lee

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How to Order Waffle House Hash Browns

I was in my fifties the first time I ate at a Waffle House. Until then, Waffle House, to me, was a place where addicts, the homeless, and the down-and-out ate. I know that doesn’t make sense. Heck, generally speaking, the homeless don’t normally eat their meals in restaurants. I don’t mean to besmirch anyone. I just didn’t think Waffle House restaurants were for me. Boy, was I wrong.

I love breakfast food, and Waffle House is all about breakfast food. Eggs any way you want. Bacon cooked to order. Sausage patties AND sausage links. Giant waffles. And best of all, hash browns.

Waffle House hash browns are like a super food. After eating them, I feel like what Popeye must feel like after eating spinach. The thing that makes Waffle House hash browns so special is the numerous ways you can order them. According to Waffle House, there are at least 768 different combinations available. So, if you’re not educated on the many options you have when you order your hash browns, you could miss out on  a magical (okay, quasi-magical) experience.

Your first, and most basic, option is to order your hash browns plain. You’ll get grilled, crispy, golden, julienned potatoes with no adornments. They’ll be good, but you’ll be missing out on all of the great toppings Waffle House offers. But before you consider the many topping options, it’s important to learn the unique Waffle House lingo. For instance:

  • Smothered — Sautéed onions grilled in butter.
  • Covered — Melted American cheese.
  • Chuncked — Grilled diced hickory smoked ham.
  • Diced — Grilled diced tomatoes.
  • Peppered — Spicy jalapeno peppers.
  • Capped — Button mushrooms sautéed in butter.
  • Topped — Bert’s Chili, a combination of chili beans, Jimmy Dean sausage, tomatoes, and onions.
  • Country — Sausage gravy.
  • All the Way — All eight topping choices.

I’ll be ordering my Waffle House hash browns smothered, capped, and covered. How about you?

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Poetry As Song: Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For

STILL HAVEN’T FOUND WHAT I’M LOOKING FOR

I have climbed highest mountains
I have run through the fields
Only to be with you
Only to be with you

I have run
I have crawled
I have scaled these city walls
These city walls
Only to be with you

But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for
But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for

I have kissed honey lips
Felt the healing in her fingertips
It burned like fire
This burning desire

I have spoke with the tongue of angels
I have held the hand of a devil
It was warm in the night
I was cold as a stone

But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for
But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for

I believe in the kingdom come
Then all the colors will bleed into one
Bleed into one
But yes I’m still running

You broke the bonds
And you loosed the chains
Carried the cross
Of my shame
Oh my shame
You know I believe it

But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for
But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for

–U2

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T.J. Newman’s Advice to Creatives

If you’ve never heard of T.J. Newman, you can be forgiven. Until fairly recently, T.J. was a flight attendant. To be more precise, she was a flight attendant with a dream. T.J. wanted to be a writer. In her spare time–and at times while she was working as a flight attendant–T.J. wrote a novel about a pilot who has to choose between purposely crashing his plane, killing everyone onboard, or having terrorists kill his family. It seemed like a great plot idea. Agents disagreed. Forty-one agents turned her down. Many of them didn’t even bother to read her writing. Forty-one rejections.

T.J thought about giving up. Who wouldn’t? But she reached out to a forty-second agent, and this one said “yes.” A few months later, T.J. had a two book deal and an advance of $1.5 million. Since then, her first book, Falling, has gone on to become a New York Times bestseller, has been distributed to more than thirty countries, and is soon to become a major motion picture. T.J. has another book, Drowning: The Rescue of Flight 1421,  coming out at the end of May 2023, and a $1.5 million movie deal.

T.J. recently penned an “Open Letter to Dreamers” in which she encourages creatives to never give up on their dreams. Here’s what she had to say:


*Originally published on Deadline.com (May 9, 2022)

I know that a lot of famous people — writers, directors, agents, lawyers, and powerbrokers — read Deadline every day.

But so do a lot of dreamers.

I know because for many years I was one of them.

This is an open letter to all the dreamers reading Deadline today.

After nearly two decades of trying and failing — and being rejected by 41 agents — last month, Warner Bros purchased the film rights to my second book, Drowning: The Rescue of Flight 1421, for $1.5 million against $3 million in a heated bidding war where five separate studios and streamers put up seven-figure offers. This is the part where I would normally say I never dreamed of something like this happening to me. But I did. I did dream. And dreams are important. They’re what keep us going. My dreams kept me going.

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